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A HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AVIATION CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO
TERRAIN ACCIDENTS OCCURRING BETWEEN 1990-1998
INTRODUCTION

alone — including an average of almost 400 fatal accidents per year (NTSB, 2001). Unfortunately, neither
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), nor
anyone else that we are aware of, has documented the
number of CFIT accidents occurring in GA annually.
But even if only 10% of the fatal GA accidents involved
CFIT (well below the averages reported in commercial or
military aviation), an alarming 40 fatal accidents per year
could be attributed to this seemingly purest of human
error accidents – and this does not even take into account
those CFIT accidents in which a fatality did not occur.

Aviation continues to be one of the safest forms of
transportation, and with the help of modern technology, is enjoying its best years ever. Still, accidents do
occur, leaving investigators with the unenviable and
often difficult task of identifying the causes, in the hope
that they might be prevented or mitigated in the future.
Using sophisticated forensic techniques and deductive
reasoning; the work of an accident investigator is much
like a detective sifting through clues to solve a mystery.
Yet, even the most skilled investigator is often at a loss
when trying to explain how a pilot could inexplicably fly
a functioning aircraft into the ground. These so-called
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents continue to beleaguer both civilian and military aviation.
So, what is “controlled” flight into terrain? After all,
it seems inconceivable that a pilot would fly an aircraft
into the ground while it was still controllable. It should
come as no surprise, then, that getting investigators and
researchers to agree on what is, and more importantly,
what is not CFIT, is difficult at best. Nevertheless, while
individual definitions of CFIT may vary, most would
agree at some level that CFIT occurs when an airworthy
aircraft, under the control of a pilot, is flown into terrain
(water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the
part of the pilot of the impending disaster (FAA, 2000).
Regardless of the nuances of each investigator’s personal
definition, no one would deny that CFIT is a serious issue
facing aviation today. In fact, if one were to use the FAA’s
definition (above), the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps alone
lost an average of ten aircraft per year to CFIT between
1983 and 1995 (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1995, 1997b).
Likewise, between 1990 and 1999, 25% of all fatal airline accidents and 32% of worldwide airline fatalities
(2,111 lives lost) have been attributed to CFIT (Boeing,
2000). In fact, since 1990, no other type of accident
has taken more lives in military or commercial aviation.
Given the accident data, no one would disagree that
CFIT accidents in the military and commercial aviation
warrant the attention they receive; but often forgotten
are the even larger number of CFIT accidents that occur
within general aviation (GA). To put it into perspective,
while the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps lose on average 2030 aircraft annually for a variety of reasons, there were
nearly 20,000 GA accidents between 1990 and 1999

CFIT Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT)
On April 14, 1998, the FAA Administrator outlined the
Agency’s safety agenda for GA, commercial aviation, and
cabin safety. Referred to as Safer Skies, the goal for GA was
to significantly reduce fatal accidents over a 11-year period
from 1996 to 2007. To accomplish that goal, six focus
areas were targeted, one of which was CFIT. Armed with
this mandate, a unique team of industry and FAA safety
professionals, the Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT), was
formed in the fall of 1998 to “identify and implement a
data driven, cost/benefit focused, safety enhancement program designed to reduce fatal general aviation accidents”
(FAA, 2000, p.13) – in particular, those involving CFIT.
The team, using accidents identified by a previous
study of CFIT performed by the Volpe Center (Volpe,
1997), examined 195 CFIT accidents that occurred
between 1993 and 1994 under a variety of operations
including: 14 CFR Part 91 (personal and business flying),
14 CFR Part 125 (privately operated transport aircraft),
14 CFR Part 133 (rotary wing external operations), 14
CFR Part 135 (air taxi), and 14 CFR Part 137 (agricultural aerial application) operations. Employing a root
cause analysis approach, the CFIT JSAT conducted a
detailed analysis of the CFIT accidents and identified
55 interventions aimed at addressing their causes. Ultimately, the team selected a set of ten interventions that
would be the most effective and feasible to implement.
In no particular order they included the following:
• Increase pilot awareness of accident causes.
• Improve the safety culture within the aviation community.
• Promote the development and use of low-cost terrain
clearance and/or look ahead devices.
1

• Improve pilot training (i.e., weather briefing, equip•
•
•
•
•
•

characteristic of a particular type of accident, it would
be adverse mental and physiological states with CFIT.
While the confirmation that spatial disorientation and
adverse mental states contribute to CFIT was important,
what was particularly revealing from the Navy study was
the large number of CFIT accidents associated with the
willful violation of the rules by aircrew — a surprising 40%
of the CFIT accidents examined. Upon further review,
it appears that whether the violations involved personal
readiness (e.g., self-medicating or simply violating crew
rest requirements) or unsafe act violations (e.g., flying into
a cloud bank when authorized for visual flight rules only),
they were often the seminal event in the tragic sequence of
events that followed. This finding was particularly relevant
because many of the interventions proposed to prevent
CFIT involved terrain avoidance and ground proximity
warning systems (GPWS) that would seemingly be of little
help if aircrew were willing to violate established safety
practices. In fact, it was felt that over-reliance on GPWS
and other related terrain avoidance systems might actually increase the likelihood that aircrew will push altitude
limits in an attempt to get an edge in training or combat.
Even more interesting than the relationship of violations with CFIT were the marked differences between
the error patterns associated with CFIT occurring
during the day versus night. Much to the surprise of
many within Naval aviation, nearly half of all CFIT
accidents occurred in broad daylight during visual meteorological conditions (VMC). After all, it had been
generally thought that most, if not all, CFIT occurred
during the night or when visual cues were otherwise
impoverished during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). It seemed reasonable therefore to ask
whether any additional differences existed between day
and night CFIT other than the obvious visual ones.
It is well known that when visual cues are limited,
coordination among the crew and personnel external to
the cockpit becomes paramount. It is not surprising then
that the incidence of crew resource management failures
was significantly higher among U.S. Navy/Marine Corps
crews during night than during daytime CFIT accidents.
Likewise, adverse physiological (e.g., spatial disorientation) and mental states (e.g., loss of situational awareness)
were more prevalent at night than during the day. This
was also anticipated, given that the lack of visual cues
would presumably lead to spatial disorientation and the

ment, decision-making, wire and tower avoidance, and
human factors).
Improve the quality and substance of weather briefs.
Enhance the Biennial Flight Review (BFR) and/or
instrument competency check.
Develop and distribute mountain flying technique
advisory material.
Standardize and expand the use of markings for towers
and wires.
Use high-visibility paint and other visibility enhancing
features on obstructions.
Eliminate the pressure to complete the flight where
continuing may compromise safety.

Even the best interventions are useless if a plan for implementing them is not drawn up. With that in mind, the
FAA chartered a second team, including several members
of the original CFIT JSAT, to develop an implementation
plan for incorporating the recommendations of the CFIT
JSAT into practice. The CFIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT) subsequently released a detailed implementation plan around eight areas that were in line with
the original CFIT JSAT report (FAA, 2000). Included in
their plan was an implementation strategy, the identification of responsible parties and resources, and a list of
milestones/completions dates to monitor the program.
U.S. Navy/Marine Corps CFIT
The military, like their civilian counterparts, has been
confronted with CFIT almost since the inception of military aviation. Nevertheless, few studies have systematically
examined the full spectrum of human error associated
with these often fatal accidents. Shappell and Wiegmann
(1997a) did conduct one such study, examining 144 U.S.
Navy/Marine Corps Class A1 accidents using an early
version of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997b). Their analyses
revealed several findings applicable to the intervention of
CFIT, some of which were unexpected, given conventional
wisdom in the area. What was consistent with previous
work, however, was that many of the U.S. Navy/Marine
Corps CFIT accidents were associated with spatial disorientation and adverse mental states such as fatigue and
the loss of situational awareness. In fact, to the extent
that any particular causal category can be considered

1

The U.S. Navy/Marine Corps considers an accident as Class A if the total cost of property damage (including all aircraft damage) is
$1,000,000 or greater; or a naval aircraft is destroyed or missing; or any fatality or permanent total disability occurs with direct involvement
of naval aircraft.

2

HFACS
It is generally accepted that aviation mishaps, like most
accidents, do not happen in isolation. Rather, they are the
result of a chain of events often culminating in the unsafe
acts of aircrew. From Heinrich’s (Heinrich, Peterson, &
Roos, 1931) axioms of industrial safety to Bird’s (1974)
“Domino theory,” a sequential theory of accident causation has been embraced by many in the field. Particularly
useful in this regard has been Reason’s (1990) relatively
recent description of active and latent failures within
the context of his “Swiss cheese” model of human error.
In general, Reason described four levels of human
failure (organizational influences, unsafe supervision,
preconditions for unsafe acts, and the unsafe acts of
operators), each one affecting the next. To hear Reason
explain it, many accidents have their roots high within
the organization, at the level of the chief executive officer, president and vice-president(s). It is the decisions
made by those at the top that often influence the middle
managers and supervisors as they oversee the day-to-day
operations of the organization. Ultimately, it is the operators at the “pointy end of the spear” who inherit all
the baggage of the organization along with those that
manage them as they perform their duties. Unfortunately,
when the system breaks down and errors occur, accidents
and incidents are the end result. So, if one wants to truly
understand the causal genesis of an accident, they must
peel the proverbial onion back, layer-by-layer, until the
causal sequence of events is uncovered in its entirety.
Yet, even as Reason’s seminal work revolutionized the
way we in aviation and other industrial settings view the human causes of accidents, it did not provide the level of detail
necessary to apply it in the real world. Therefore, drawing
upon Reason’s (1990) original work, the human factors
analysis and classification system (HFACS) was developed
to fill that need (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000a, 2001a).
The HFACS framework describes 17 causal categories within Reason’s four levels of human failure (Figure
1). However, because our previous work (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2001b) using GA accidents has shown that
the causal factors typically populate only the bottom two
tiers of HFACS (the preconditions for unsafe acts and the
unsafe acts of operators) we will limit our discussion to
them. A complete description of all four tiers can be
found elsewhere (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000a, 2001a).

loss of situational awareness. What was not expected was
the rather large proportion of violations (nearly half of all
the CFIT accidents examined) occurred mostly during the
day. Given that violations almost invariably predicate other
factors within the HFACS framework, this finding became
a significant source of information for those designing
systems to address CFIT in the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps.
A rationale for an HFACS analysis of GA accidents
Without question, the work of the CFIT JSAT and
JSIT represent a landmark effort within civil aviation.
However, while the interventions identified by the CFIT
JSAT represent the views and opinions of experts in industry and the FAA, their findings might have benefited
from a more focused human error analysis like that used
with the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps accidents – particularly
one that was not constrained by a relatively small sample
of accidents. This is not to imply that the CFIT JSAT
study was flawed. Quite the contrary, the CFIT JSAT
was working within the logistical and time constraints
they were given. As a result, they based their conclusions
on a relatively small subset of accidents from a variety of
aircraft operations rather than GA alone. This was done
primarily because no one had systematically examined the
GA accident record for CFIT accidents, perhaps due to
the general lack of agreement on what a CFIT accident
is. Since the JSAT convened, however, a joint International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)/Commercial
Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Common Taxonomy Team
has published a definition of CFIT accepted by many in
the field (including the National Transportation Safety
Board in the United States and ICAO) similar to that
used by the CFIT JSAT. Specifically, the ICAO/CAST
defined CFIT as an “inflight collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without indication of a loss of control.”
The aim of this study therefore was to examine a
large body of GA accidents using the CAST/ICAO
criteria for CFIT. Then, after differentiating CFIT
from non-CFIT accidents, a more detailed human error
analysis could be performed. Given the success that the
U.S. Navy/Marine Corps and other organizations have
experienced using HFACS, it seemed reasonable to apply the HFACS framework to the GA accident database
in the hope that similar results could be achieved. To
familiarize the reader with the relevant aspects of the
HFACS framework, it will be briefly reviewed here.
Note however that a more complete description can
be found elsewhere (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001a).

Unsafe Acts of Operators
The first level of HFACS describes those unsafe acts of
operators that can lead to an accident. Perhaps unfairly
referred to in aviation as aircrew/pilot error since many

3
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unsafe acts do not involve aircrew, this level is where
most accident investigations are focused and consequently,
where the majority of causal factors are uncovered. The
unsafe acts of operators can be loosely classified into one
of two categories: errors and violations. While both are
common within most settings, they differ markedly when
the rules and regulations of an organization are considered.
That is, errors can best be described as those activities that
fail to achieve their intended outcome, while violations are
commonly defined as behavior that represents the willful
disregard for the rules and regulations. However, merely
distinguishing between errors and violations does not provide the level of granularity required of most error analyses
and accident investigations. Therefore, the categories of
errors and violations were expanded here (Figure 1), as
elsewhere (Reason, 1990; Rasmussen, 1982), to include
three basic error types (decision, skill-based, and perceptual) and two forms of violations (routine and exceptional).

inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. Often referred to as “honest mistakes,” this type of error can generally be grouped into one of three categories: procedural
errors, poor choices, and problem-solving errors (Table
1). Procedural decision errors (Orasanu, 1993), or rulebased mistakes (as described by Rasmussen, 1982), occur
during highly structured tasks of the sorts, if A, then do B,
then do C. Aviation, particularly within the military and
commercial sectors, by its very nature is highly structured,
and consequently, much of pilot decision-making is procedural. In fact, there are very explicit procedures to be
performed in virtually all phases of flight. Still, errors can,
and often do, occur when a situation is either not recognized or misdiagnosed and the wrong procedure is applied.
Even in aviation, however, not all situations have
corresponding procedures that address them. Instead,
many situations require that a choice be made among
multiple response options. Consider, for instance, the
pilot who unexpectedly confronts a line of thunderstorms directly along the intended flight path. He or
she can choose to fly around the weather, divert to
another field until the weather passes, or penetrate the
weather hoping to quickly transition through it. When

Errors
Decision Errors. Perhaps the most heavily investigated
of all error forms, decision errors represent intentional
behavior that proceeds as intended, yet the plan proves
4
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confronted with situations such as these, choice decision
errors (Orasanu, 1993), or knowledge-based mistakes
as they are otherwise known (Rasmussen, 1982), may
occur. This is particularly true when there is insufficient experience, time, or other outside pressures that
may preclude correct decisions. Put simply, sometimes
individuals chose well, and sometimes they don’t.
Finally, there are occasions when a problem is not well
understood and formal procedures or response options
are not available. It is during these ill-defined situations
that the construction of a novel solution is required. In a
sense, individuals find themselves where no one has been
before, and in many ways, must “fly by the seats of their
pants.” Individuals placed in this situation must resort
to slow and effortful reasoning processes where time is a
luxury rarely afforded. Consequently, while this type of
decision-making is more infrequent than other types, the
relative proportion of errors committed is markedly higher.
Skill-based Errors. In contrast to decision errors, the
second error form, skill-based errors, occur with little or no
conscious thought. Just as little thought goes into turning
one’s steering wheel or shifting gears in an automobile,
basic flight skills such as stick and rudder movements and
visual scanning often occur without conscious thought.
The difficulty with these seemingly automatic behaviors
is that they are particularly susceptible to attention and/or
memory failures. In fact, attention failures have been
linked to many skill-based errors such as the breakdown
in visual scan patterns, task fixation, and the inadvertent
activation of controls. Consider, for example, a crew that
becomes so fixated on trouble-shooting a burned out
warning light that they fail to monitor their altimeter
and end up flying into the ground. Perhaps a bit closer
to home, consider the hapless soul who locks himself out
of the car or misses his exit while driving because he was
either distracted, in a hurry, or daydreaming. These are
both examples of attention failures that commonly occur during highly automatized behavior. While at home
or driving around town, these attention failures may
be frustrating, but in the air they can be catastrophic.
In contrast, memory failures often appear as omitted
items in a checklist, place losing, or forgotten intentions.
For example, many of us have forgotten to replace the
gas cap after refueling the family car or failed to put the
coffee in the coffeepot before turning it on. Likewise, it is
not difficult to imagine that when under the stress of an
inflight emergency, for example, or after a long, fatiguing
flight, critical steps in a procedure can be missed. Yet, even
when not particularly stressed, individuals have forgotten
to set the flaps on approach or lower the landing gear.
Even the manner (or skill) with which one flies an
aircraft (aggressive, tentative, or controlled) can affect
safety. For example, two pilots with identical training,

flight grades, and experience may differ significantly in
the way they fly. That is, some pilots may fly smooth and
effortlessly, while others are more forceful and rough on
the flight controls. Both may be safe and equally proficient
in the air; however, given certain scenarios, the techniques
they employ could set them up for failure. Likewise, there
are some pilots who are very safe in daytime VMC conditions, but put them in a situation where they are flying at
night or IMC and their skill quickly degrades to unsafe
levels. In the end, such techniques are as much a factor
of innate ability and aptitude as they are an overt expression of one’s personality, making efforts at the prevention
and mitigation of technique errors particularly difficult.
Perceptual Errors. While, decision and skill-based
errors have dominated most accident databases and
have therefore been included in most error frameworks,
perceptual errors have received comparatively less attention. No less important, perceptual errors occur when
sensory input is degraded or “unusual,” as is often the
case when flying at night, in the weather, or in other visually impoverished environments. Faced with acting on
imperfect information, aircrew run the risk of misjudging
distances, altitude, and decent rates, as well as a responding incorrectly to a variety of visual/vestibular illusions.
It is important to note, however, that it is not the illusion or disorientation that is classified as a perceptual
error. Rather, it is the pilot’s erroneous response to the illusion or disorientation that is captured here. For example,
many pilots have experienced spatial disorientation (often
referred to as the “leans”) when flying in IMC. In instances
such as these, pilots are taught to rely on their primary
instruments, rather than their senses when controlling the
aircraft. Still, some pilots fail to monitor their instruments
when flying in adverse weather or at night, choosing instead to fly using fallible cues from their senses. Tragically,
many of these aircrew and others who have been fooled
by illusions and other disorientating flight regimes have
wound up on the wrong end of the accident investigation.
Violations
By definition, errors occur while aircrews are behaving within the rules and regulations implemented
by an organization and typically dominate most accident databases. In contrast, violations represent
the willful disregard for the rules and regulations
that govern safe flight and, fortunately, occur much
less frequently (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1995).
Routine Violations. While there are many ways to
distinguish between types of violations, two distinct forms
have been identified, based on their etiology. The first, routine violations, tend to be habitual by nature and are often
tolerated by the governing authority (Reason, 1990). Consider, for example, the individual who drives consistently
6

5-10 mph faster than allowed by law or someone who
routinely flies in marginal weather when authorized for visual meteorological conditions only. While both certainly
violate governing regulations, many drivers or pilots do the
same thing. Furthermore, people who regularly drive 64
mph in a 55-mph zone, almost always drive 64 in a 55mph zone. That is, they routinely violate the speed limit.
Often referred to as “bending the rules,” these violations are often tolerated and, in effect, sanctioned by
authority (i.e., you’re not likely to get a traffic citation
until you exceed the posted speed limit by more than
10 mph). If, however, local authorities started handing out traffic citations for exceeding the speed limit
on the highway by 9 mph or less, then it is less likely
that individuals would violate the rules. By definition
then, if a routine violation is identified, investigators
must look further up the causal chain to identify those
individuals in authority who are not enforcing the rules.
Exceptional Violations. In contrast, exceptional violations appear as isolated departures from authority, not
necessarily characteristic of an individual’s behavior nor
condoned by management (Reason, 1990). For example,
an isolated instance of driving 105 mph in a 55-mph zone
is considered an exceptional violation. Likewise, flying
under a bridge or engaging in other particularly dangerous
and prohibited maneuvers would constitute an exceptional violation. However, it is important to note that,
while most exceptional violations are indefensible, they
are not considered exceptional because of their extreme
nature. Rather, they are considered exceptional because
they are neither typical of the individual nor condoned
by authority. Unfortunately, the unexpected nature of
exceptional violations make them particularly difficult to
predict and problematic for organizations to deal with.

tions for unsafe acts: Substandard conditions of operators
and the substandard practices they commit (Figure 1).
Substandard Conditions of the Operators
Adverse Mental States. Being prepared mentally
is critical in nearly every endeavor, perhaps more so
in aviation. With this in mind, the first of three categories, adverse mental states, was created to account
for those mental conditions that adversely affect performance (Table 2). Principal among these are the loss
of situational awareness, mental fatigue, and pernicious
attitudes like overconfidence and complacency, which
negatively affect decisions and contribute to unsafe acts.
Consider, for example, the individual who is mentally fatigued or suffering the effects of sleep loss. The
likelihood that an error will occur given these preconditions becomes more predicable. In a similar manner,
overconfidence and other pernicious attitudes such
as arrogance and impulsivity influence the likelihood
that a violation will be committed. Clearly then, any
framework of human error must account for these
preexisting adverse mental states if a thorough understanding of the causal chain of events is to be realized.
Adverse Physiological States. The second category, adverse physiological states, refers to those
medical or physiological conditions that interfere
with safe operations (Table 2). Particularly important
to aviation are such conditions as visual illusions and
spatial disorientation as described earlier, as well as
physical fatigue and the myriad of pharmacological and
medical abnormalities known to affect performance.
While the adverse effects associated with visual illusions and spatial disorientation are well known among
those in aviation circles, the effects of simply being ill
on aircrew performance are less well known and often
overlooked. Consider the pilot suffering from the common head cold. Unfortunately, most aviators view a
head cold as only a minor inconvenience that can be
easily remedied using over-the-counter antihistamines,
acetaminophen, and other non-prescription medications.
However, it is not the overt symptoms of the cold that
flight surgeons are concerned with. Rather, it is the accompanying ear infection and the increased likelihood
of spatial disorientation when entering IMC that is
alarming — not to mention the side-effects of antihistamines, fatigue, and sleep loss on pilot decision-making.
Physical/Mental Limitations. The final class of substandard conditions involves individual physical/mental
limitations (Table 2). Specifically, this category refers to
those instances when mission requirements exceed the
capabilities of the individual at the controls. For example, the human visual system is severely limited at

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Simply focusing on unsafe acts, however, is like focusing on a patient’s symptoms without understanding the
underlying disease state that caused them. As such, what
makes Reason’s (1990) “Swiss cheese” model particularly
useful in accident investigation, is that it encourages investigators to address the latent failures within the causal
sequence of events as well as the more obvious, active
failures described above. As their name suggests, latent
failures, unlike their active counterparts, may lie dormant
or undetected for hours, days, weeks, or even longer, until
one day they adversely affect the unsuspecting aircrew.
Historically, such latent failures have often been overlooked by investigators, largely because the so-called “holes
in the cheese” that adversely affect aircrew performance
have not been clearly defined. To remedy this, HFACS
describes two major subdivisions within the precondi7
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night; yet, when driving an automobile, many drivers
do not necessarily slow down or take additional precautions. Likewise, in aviation, while slowing down is
not necessarily an option, increasing one’s vigilance for
other aircraft or obstacles whose size or contrast interferes
with their detection will often increase the safety margin.
Similarly, there are occasions when the time required
to complete a task or maneuver exceeds an individual’s
capacity. That is, while good pilots are typically noted
for their ability to react quickly and accurately, individuals vary widely in their ability to process and respond
to information. Still, even given individual differences, if any operator or pilot is required to respond
quickly (as is the case in many aviation emergencies),
the probability of making an error will likely increase.
In addition to the basic sensory and information processing limitations described above, there are at least two

additional instances of physical/mental limitations that
need to be addressed, albeit often overlooked by most
safety professionals. These limitations involve individuals
who simply are not compatible with aviation, because
they are either physically unsuited or do not possess the
aptitude to fly. For example, some individuals simply do
not have the physical strength or dexterity to operate in
the unique aviation environment, or for anthropometric
reasons, simply have difficulty reaching the controls. In
other words, cockpits have traditionally not been designed with all shapes, sizes, and physical abilities in mind.
Likewise, not everyone has the mental ability or
aptitude for flying aircraft. Just as not all of us can be
concert pianists or NFL linebackers, not everyone has
the innate ability to pilot an aircraft – a vocation that
requires the unique ability to make decisions quickly
and respond accurately in life-threatening situations.
8

The difficult task for the safety professional is identifying whether physical abilities or aptitude might
have contributed to the accident causal sequence.

environment of aviation. While there may be no rules
governing such behavior, pilots must use good judgment
when deciding whether they are ready and “fit” to fly.

Substandard Practices of the Operator
Clearly, then, numerous substandard conditions of
operators can, and do, lead to the commission of unsafe
acts. Nevertheless, there are a number of things that individuals do to themselves that set up these substandard
conditions. Generally speaking, the substandard practices of operators can be summed up in two categories:
crew resource management and personal readiness.
Crew Resource Management. Good communication skills and team coordination have been the mantra
of industrial/organizational and personnel psychologists for decades. As one might expect, crew resource
management has been a cornerstone of many aviation
safety programs as well (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993;
Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999). As a result, the category
of crew resource mismanagement was created to account for occurrences of poor coordination among
personnel. Within the context of aviation, this includes
coordination both within and between aircraft, with
air traffic control personnel and maintenance control,
as well as with facility and other support personnel as
necessary. Likewise, good crew resource management
includes coordination before and after the flight in the
form of pre-flight briefings and debriefings as necessary.
Personnel Readiness. In aviation, or for that matter
in any occupational setting, individuals are expected to
show up for work ready to perform at optimal levels.
However, in aviation as in other professions, individuals
have been known to report for duty ill prepared, having
violated crew rest requirements, bottle-to-brief rules,
and rules associated with self-medicating. For example,
when individuals violate crew rest requirements, they
run the risk of mental fatigue and other adverse mental
states that may ultimately lead to errors and accidents2.
Still, not all personal readiness failures occur because of
violations of governing rules or regulations. For instance,
running 10 miles before piloting an aircraft may not be
against any existing regulations, yet it may impair the
physical and mental capabilities of the individual enough
to degrade performance and elicit unsafe acts. Likewise, the
traditional “candy bar and coke” lunch of the modern businessman might be common but may not be sufficient to
sustain performance in the often complex and demanding

METHOD
Data
General aviation accident data from calendar years
1990-98 was obtained from databases maintained by
the NTSB and the FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data
Analysis Center (NASDAC). In total, 17,994 GA accidents were extracted for analysis. These so-called “GA”
accidents actually included a variety of aircraft being flown
under several different operating rules: 1) 14 CFR Part
91 – Civil aircraft other than moored balloons, kites,
unmanned rockets, and unmanned free balloons; 2) 14
CFR Part 91F – Large and turbine-powered multiengine
airplanes; 3) 14 CFR Part 103 – Ultralight vehicles; 4)
14 CFR Part 125 – Airplanes with seating capacity of 20
or more passengers or a maximum payload capacity of
6,000 pounds or more; 5) 14 CFR Part 133 – Rotorcraft
external-load operations; 6) 14 CFR Part 137 – Agricultural aircraft operations. In addition, the database
contained several accidents involving public use aircraft
(i.e., law enforcement, state owned aircraft, etc.) and
some midair accidents involving military aircraft. The
distribution of each of these accident categories within
the NTSB/NASDC databases is presented in Table 3.
Of the 17,994 accidents listed in Table 3, 157 investigations still remained incomplete at the time of this
analysis and were eliminated from further consideration3.
An additional 1,168 accidents were classified as due to
undetermined causes and were also eliminated from the
analysis. In addition, we were concerned with the apparent
heterogeneity of the accident sample as depicted in Table
3 even though all of the accidents listed can be found
within the NTSB under the heading of “general aviation.”
However, we were only interested in those accidents involving aircraft operating under 14 CFR Part 91. After
all, it is difficult to envision that large commercial aircraft
being ferried from one airport to the next (operating
under 14 CFR Part 91F) or aircraft being used to spread
chemicals on a field (operating under 14 CFR Part 137)
can be equated with small private aircraft being flown
for personal or recreational purposes (operating under
14 CFR Part 91). This left us with 16,510 accidents
in the database. Next, the accidents were examined for

2
Note that violations that affect personal readiness are not considered “unsafe act, violations” since they typically do not happen in the cockpit,
nor are they necessarily active failures with direct and immediate consequences.
3
The NTSB classifies the results of accident investigations as either “preliminary” or “final” within their database. Only those designated as
final by the NTSB as of May 30, 2002 were used in this study.
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After our pilot-raters made their initial classifications of the human causal factors (i.e., skill-based error, decision-error, etc.), the two independent ratings
were compared. Where disagreements existed, the
corresponding pilot-raters were called into the laboratory to reconcile their differences and the consensus
classification was included in the database for further
analysis. Overall, pilot-raters agreed on the classification of causal factors within the HFACS framework
more than 85% of the time (29,534 agreements; 4519
disagreements), an excellent level of agreement considering that this was, in effect, a decision-making task.4
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CFIT analysis
In addition to the analysis of human causal factors
using HFACS, the five pilot-raters were instructed to
independently classify each accident as CFIT or nonCFIT using the definition provided by the ICAO/CAST
Common Taxonomy Team that defined CFIT as the “inflight collision with terrain, water, or obstacle without
indication of a loss of control.” Accompanying the
definition were a series of usage notes that further defined the accident category. They included the following:
• CFIT is used only for accidents occurring during
airborne phases of flight.
• CFIT includes collisions with those objects extending
above the surface (for example: towers).
• CFIT can occur during either Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or Visual Meteorological
Conditions (VMC).
• This category includes instances when the aircrew is
affected by visual illusions (e.g., black hole approaches)
that result in the aircraft being flown under control
into terrain, water, or obstacles.
• If control of the aircraft is lost (induced by crew, weather,
or equipment failure), do not use this category.
• Do not use this category for occurrences involving
intentional flight into terrain (i.e., suicide).
• Do not use this category for occurrences involving
runway undershoot/overshoot.

aircrew-related causal factors. Again, we were only interested in those involving aircrew error, not those accidents
that were purely mechanical in nature or those with other
human involvement. This does not mean that mechanical
failures or other sources of human error did not exist in
the final database, only that some form of aircrew error
was also involved in each of the accidents included in the
final database. In the end, 14,086 accidents involving
31,491 aircrew causal factors were included and submitted to further analyses using the HFACS framework.
Causal Factor Classification using HFACS
Five GA pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma
City area as subject matter experts and received roughly
16 hours of training on the HFACS framework. All five
were certified flight instructors with a minimum of 1,000
flight hours in GA aircraft (mean = 3,530 flight hours) as
of June 1999 when the study began. After training, the
five GA pilot-raters were randomly assigned accidents so
at least two separate pilot-raters analyzed each accident
independently. Using narrative and tabular data obtained
from both the NTSB and the FAA NASDAC, the pilot-raters were instructed to classify each human causal
factor using the HFACS framework. Note, however,
that only those causal factors identified by the NTSB
were classified. That is, the pilot-raters were instructed
not to introduce additional casual factors that were not
identified by the original investigation. To do so would
be presumptuous and only infuse additional opinion,
conjecture, and guesswork into the analysis process.

Finally, there was some concern that intrinsic
differences between controlled flight into “terrain”
(water or the ground) and controlled flight into
“obstacles” (e.g., telephone wires, buildings, or other
man-made structures) might exist. For this reason,
pilot-raters were also instructed to differentiate
CFIT accidents along this dimension as well.

4

The measure of agreement was a combined analysis of all accidents coded under the NTSB classification of “general aviation” and therefore
includes accidents other than 14 CFR Part 91 as described above. A breakout by 14 CFR Part 91 alone was not possible at this time but there
is no reason to believe that the level of agreement would change appreciably.
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RESULTS

were instructed to use the parent causal category of “violations,” rather than distinguish between the two types.
The overall analysis of 14 CFR Part 91 accidents revealed a picture of human error within GA that was not
possible before the development of HFACS. For instance,
the data indicate that skill-based errors (73.5% of the
14,086 GA accidents) were the most frequently cited
unsafe act committed by aircrew, followed by decision
errors (35.1%), violations (14.3%), and perceptual errors
(7.7%). The finding that the unsafe acts of operators accounted for the majority of causal factors in the database
was anticipated, given the emphasis of most investigations. However, the preconditions for unsafe acts were
no less important. In fact, physical/mental limitations
were among the most prevalent of all the HFACS causal
categories cited, contributing to 18.3% of the accidents
examined. The remaining preconditions for unsafe acts,
in order of prevalence, were CRM failures (10.6%),
adverse mental states (5.3%), adverse physiological
states (2.6%), and personal readiness failures (2.1%).
The preceding analysis of the data represents a “quick
look” at the human error issues facing GA. Yet, alone it
provides little insight into the pattern of errors associated
with any specific type of accident, like CFIT. The next
step, therefore was to investigate what differences, if any,
existed in the type and frequency of errors committed by
aircrew involved in CFIT versus those observed in other

The GA data were initially examined to determine
the extent to which each HFACS causal category contributed to GA accidents overall. To accomplish this, the
frequency and percentage of GA accidents associated with
each HFACS causal category were calculated. However,
to avoid over-representation by any single accident, each
causal category was counted a maximum of one time per
accident. In this way, the count acted as an indicator of
the presence or absence of a particular HFACS causal category for a given accident. The data were calculated in this
manner with the knowledge that most aviation accidents
are associated with multiple causal factors, including on
some occasions, multiple instances of the same HFACS
causal category (e.g., multiple decision errors may have
been committed). However, only by analyzing the data in
this way could a true representation of the percentage of
accidents associated with each causal category be obtained.
The number and percentage of accidents associated
with at least one instance of a particular HFACS causal
category can be found in Figure 2, with one notable exception. As with post-hoc data examined in other venues
(e.g., the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps, U.S. Army, U.S. Air
Force, etc.), it proved too difficult to differentiate between
routine and exceptional violations using narrative data
from the NTSB and NASDAC. As a result, pilot-raters
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types of accidents. An examination of the GA accidents
revealed that 1,407 (roughly 10 percent), of the 14,086
accidents were classified as CFIT by our pilot-raters using
the criteria established by the CAST/ICAO Common
Taxonomy Team. While the actual number and percentage
of accidents associated with CFIT is a new and important
finding in and of itself, the larger question was whether
there were any differences in the pattern of errors associated with CFIT and the 12,679 non-CFIT accidents.
An inspection of Figure 3 reveals that the proportion of accidents associated with each HFACS causal
category varied markedly between CFIT and non-CFIT
accidents. The difficulty was in determining which differences, if any, were actually significant, and more
importantly, which were meaningful. Traditionally,
nonparametric statistics, like Chi-square, are used to
measure the association between two nominal (indicator)
variables. However, Chi-square, like many other nonparametric statistics, are fraught with problems where
large data sets are involved. That is, as the sample size
increases, the more likely it is to find significance where
only small, perhaps trivial, differences actually exist.
One option is to use a measure of association that is not
affected by sample size, like the odds ratio. Commonly

used in epidemiology, the odds ratio is typically used to
measure the degree of the association between two variables or the ratio of the odds of suffering some particular
fate given certain characteristics. Consider, for example,
the odds of surviving an automobile accident with or
without using a seatbelt5. If drivers suffer fatal injuries
20% of the time when they use their seatbelts, the odds
of dying in a car accident while wearing a seatbelt are
0.25 (0.2 die with their seatbelt on / 0.8 survive with
their seatbelt on). In contrast, 35% of drivers not wearing seatbelts die in automobile accidents, giving odds of
0.538 (0.35 die with their seatbelt off / 0.65 live with
their seatbelt off ). Thus, the odds ratio is 0.465 (0.25/
0.538). In other words, you have a 0.465 times higher
chance of dying in an automobile accident with your
seatbelt on than without it. Arguably, this is hard to
interpret, so with numbers of less than one we typically
calculate the inverse of the odds ratio, which in this case
equals 2.15 (1/0.465). This means that you would be
2.15 times more likely to die in an automobile accident
if you did not wear your seatbelt than if you had worn it.
Another option is to dispense with traditional nonparametric statistics altogether, and compare the differences observed in the percentage data associated with
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These data are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only. They are not the official statistics of the NTSB or Bureau of Transportation
Statistics.
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each HFACS causal category for CFIT and non-CFIT
accidents against some preset level considered “operationally relevant.” But, who is to say which differences are
operationally relevant, and which are not? After all, is a
difference between CFIT and non-CFIT accidents of
five percentage points more operationally relevant than
say three or four percent — or perhaps, one should use a
larger percentage like 10 percent? In the end, the decision
is subjective and often left to the researcher to defend.
Regardless of whether one uses traditional statistics or
simply chooses an operationally relevant difference, there
really is no right or wrong answer. Therefore, left without
a clear-cut option, we chose to use the more objective approach of nonparametric statistics (Chi square and odds
ratios) but with a considerably more conservative p value
(p<.001) than is typically reported in other studies (p<.05
is generally regarded as acceptable within the psychological
literature). Our intention was to capitalize on the objective power of statistics while minimizing the problems
associated with potentially inconsequential findings.
Using this approach, the results of the Chi-square analysis are presented for each HFACS causal category in Table 4.
Also included are the corresponding odds ratios with a 95%
confidence interval as a measure of the relative risk of CFIT
given a particular causal category. For illustrative purposes,
the results of the analyses in Table 4 have been translated
into Figure 3 by shading the corresponding HFACS
causal categories where significant differences existed.

In some ways, the pattern of human error was similar
for CFIT and non-CFIT accidents, as skill-based and
decision errors were the most frequently cited causes
of both. However, important differences did exist. For
instance, almost one-third of all CFIT accidents were
associated with violations of the rules compared with
just over 12% for non-CFIT accidents, yielding an
odds ratio of 3.264. Likewise, personal readiness failures (e.g., failing to obtain adequate rest, self medicating,
etc.), arguably another type of violation only occurring
external to the cockpit, were over four times more likely
during CFIT accidents. Adverse mental states (odds ratio = 2.907) and perceptual errors (odds ratio = 1.847)
were also more prevalent during CFIT than non-CFIT
accidents. In contrast, physical/mental limitations
(e.g., the inability to maintain control of the aircraft)
and failures of crew resource management were more
likely to occur during non-CFIT than CFIT accidents6.
The Effect of Visual Conditions on CFIT
When discussing CFIT, many safety professionals have
suggested that these accidents typically occur at night or
in adverse weather when pilots simply may not be able to
see their impending collision with the terrain or obstacles.
However, it now appears that more of these accidents
occur during VMC (n=867; 61.6%) than IMC (n=501;
35.6%)7, although the percentage that occurred in VMC
was considerably less than that observed for non-CFIT
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6
When interpreting an odds ratio of less than 1, the inverse of the ratio is calculated. For example, the odds ratio associated with physical/
mental limitations was 0.639, indicating that physical/mental limitations were 1/0.639, or roughly 1.5 times more likely to occur during
non-CFIT than CFIT accidents.
7
The weather conditions at the time of the accident were unknown for 39 (2.8%) CFIT accidents and 62 (0.5%) non-CFIT accidents, while
the lighting conditions were unknown for two (0.1%) CFIT and four (0.003%) non-CFIT accidents. Weather and lighting combined were
used to identify visual conditions (impoverished versus clear). When the data were examined in this manner, visual conditions were completely
unknown for 27 (1.9%) CFIT and 43 (0.3%) non-CFIT accidents. Percentages reported in the text and Figure 5 reflect these data.
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accidents (Figure 4, upper left). Furthermore, it appears that
a greater percentage of CFIT accidents occur during the
day (n=923; 65.6%) than at dawn or dusk (n=82; 5.8%)
or even at night (n=400; 28.4%; Figure 4, upper right).
However, simply looking at lighting conditions without
considering the weather, or vice-versa, really only presents
part of the picture. Therefore, we combined the weather
with the lighting information and examined the percentage of CFIT and non-CFIT accidents occurring during
visually impoverished (i.e., accidents occurring either at
night or in IMC) and clear daytime conditions. Yet, even
when the data were examined in this way (Figure 4, lower
panel), nearly as many CFIT accidents occurred in clear
daytime conditions (n=685; 48.7%) as during visually impoverished conditions (n=695; 49.4%). While this finding
might not have been predicted by those in the GA community, it was not unprecedented given the previous findings
of Shappell and Wiegmann (1997a) using U.S. Navy/
Marine Corps accident data. In contrast, considerably
more non-CFIT accidents occurred in clear conditions.
Although there appears to be very little difference in
the number of accidents that occurred during clear and
visually impoverished conditions, the question remains
whether the pattern of human error differed appreciably
for the different visual conditions. Indeed, the data presented in Figure 5 suggest that in some ways the underlying

causes are intrinsically different. For instance, those CFIT
accidents that occurred during visually impoverished
conditions were more often associated with violations
of the rules, adverse physiological states, physical/mental
limitations, and poor crew resource management (Table
5). Perhaps not surprising, aircrew involved in a CFIT accident during visually impoverished conditions were well
over six times more likely to have committed a violation
of the rules. They were also five times more likely to have
been affected by adverse physiological states (e.g., misjudging altitude and spatial disorientation) and more likely
to mismanage their resources (e.g., failing to obtain an
adequate preflight weather brief or update prior to departure). Indeed, one could almost envision a crew that fails
to obtain a weather update prior to takeoff (crew resource
management) and then encounters weather enroute.
Then, after choosing to continue into IMC when VFR
only (violation), they end up misjudging their altitude
(adverse physiological state) and collide with the terrain.
In contrast to visually impoverished conditions,
trying to understand why a pilot would collide with
terrain in clear daytime conditions is somewhat more
puzzling. However, the odds ratio data may provide
a clue. It appears that pilots involved with CFIT in
clear daytime conditions are well over two times more
likely (1/0.436 = 2.29) to have committed a skill-based
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error than those involved in other types of accidents.
Given that skill-based behavior is often the result of
inattention and simple stick-and-rudder skills, perhaps
they were either not proficient or simply preoccupied
with other things. In either event, the human errors associated with CFIT in clear and visually impoverished
conditions are fundamentally different with regard to
the types of human error more often associated with it.
Collision With “Terrain/water” Versus Collision
With “Obstacles”
There was some concern that a definition of CFIT that
equates collision with terrain/water with collision with
obstacles might be akin to “comparing apples and oranges,”
at least from a human factors perspective. To address this
concern, we examined the pattern of human errors associated with collision with terrain/water (n=826) and that
with obstacles (n=581). An inspection of Figure 6 revealed
very few differences between the two types of CFIT, including no differences among the preconditions for unsafe
acts. In fact, the only differences were among skill-based
and perceptual errors (Table 6). Specifically, skill-based
errors were nearly two times more likely (odds ratio =
1.759) when the collision was with the terrain/water. In
contrast, collision with obstacles was more often associated with perceptual errors (odds ratio = 1/0.574 or 1.74).

DISCUSSION
Accidents and the tragic loss of life that often accompany them have confronted aviation since the first flights
of the Wright Brothers. Still, when a healthy pilot flies a
perfectly good aircraft into the ground, the pundits grow
eerily quiet. Of all the ways one can crash an aircraft,
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is arguably the
hardest to explain and therefore begs the question, “Why
would an experienced aviator fly a perfectly good aircraft
into the ground” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1995, 1997a)?
Historically, several explanations for CFIT have been
offered such as the loss of visual cues at night or during
IMC, inattention or distraction during periods of high
workload, or simply poor aviation skills. In response,
civilian and military organizations have instituted more
conservative altitude restrictions, provided additional
safety awareness training, and employed the use of altitude and ground proximity warning systems (GPWS).
Undeniably, these intervention strategies have helped
save many lives by either requiring aircrews to maintain
greater separation from hazardous terrain or by alerting
flight crews to an impending collision with the terrain.
However, their utility in the realm of general aviation varies dramatically from that of their military or commercial
aviation counterparts. For instance, most GA enthusiasts

Figure 5. Percentage of CFIT accidents occurring in clear versus visually impoverished
conditions associated with at least one instance of each particular causal category. Statistics associated with violations have been collapsed across type of violation committed. Significant differences (p<.001) are represented by shaded boxes.
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do not have the monetary resources of the military or
commercial sector, making many new technologies such
as GPWS difficult to afford. Simply enforcing existing
Federal Air Regulations is likely not the answer either. After
all, there are more GA aircraft in the U.S. than there are
military and commercial aircraft combined; not to mention, many of these GA aircraft fly in unrestricted airspace,
making enforcement a difficult prospect, indeed. So, if the
availability of terrain warnings or the enforcement of more
conservative altitude restrictions alone are not likely to
have a significant affect on GA CFIT, what is the answer?
A major step in addressing this challenge was taken
by the GA CFIT JSAT and JSIT. In their final report to
the Joint Steering Committee, the CFIT JSAT identified 55 intervention strategies, finally settling on a “top
10” that were submitted to the CFIT JSIT. The primary
goal of the CFIT JSIT was to develop an implementation strategy that identified the resources, responsible
parties, milestones for implementing the interventions,
as well as metrics for tracking their success. In the end,
the CFIT JSIT produced a detailed and prioritized
implementation plan8 with the following components:
1. Streamline equipment installation. Terrain avoidance and other equipment have been available for
some time within military and commercial aviation.
However, for many GA pilots, such technology is out
of reach due to cost concerns and the simple fact that
in many cases new technology in use within military
and commercial aviation has not been modified for
GA aircraft. Given “low cost” displays that enhance
terrain awareness and reduce pilot workload are being
developed, perhaps the process for certifying the new

technology can be streamlined within the FAA.
2. Enhance pilot training for CFIT awareness and
prevention. Specifically, the JSIT recommended that
Practical Test Standards, Knowledge Tests, and other
training materials be modified to include knowledge
of how CFIT occurs and how to prevent it.
3. Establish a General Aviation Safety Council. The idea
was to establish a council of safety experts from the
government (FAA, NTSB, and NASA) and industry to
act as a vehicle for launching safety-related programs
and distributing information to the GA community
in a more expeditious and efficient manner.
4. Increase pilot awareness on CFIT accident causes.
The JSIT proposed establishing a Web page on the
FAA’s Internet site that would increase pilot awareness
of the causes of CFIT and relay first-person accounts
of “near-CFIT” accidents. Also included here was a
recommendation for the NTSB to begin classifying
accidents as CFIT or non-CFIT within their accident
reports to track trends in the data and facilitate future
analyses.
5. Develop education, awareness, and training modules
for CFIT prevention. This area focuses on the development of several training modules centered about
CFIT awareness and risk-taking behavior similar to the
widely disseminated personal minimums checklist.
6. Standardize and expand requirements for enhancing
the visibility and detection of wires, support structures, and towers. Surprisingly, there are no standardized criteria for the marking of obstacles or hazards.
Therefore, it was proposed that a national standard
for marking wires and towers be developed, as well as

8
For a more thorough discussion of each of these components, see Federal Aviation Administration (2000). General aviation controlled flight
into terrain Joint Safety Implementation Team: Final Report.
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a passive (e.g., visual markings) and active (e.g., avionics equipment capable of sensing obstacles) means of
detecting wires, towers and other obstacles.
7. Develop routes for GPS waypoints for mountain
passes. While somewhat controversial, it was recommended that with the advent of GPS, that waypoints
for safely flying through mountain passes could be made
available. Some have argued, though, that this would
only convey a false sense of ease to pilots attempting
the complex and often demanding task of traversing
through high-altitude mountain passes.
8. Enhance digital user access terminals (DUATS) to
provide density altitude advisories. In particular, pilots
would receive a density altitude advisory at both the
departure and destination airports, as well as areas
along their intended route.

fatal flaw before impacting the ground – particularly
among CFIT accidents. The real culprit in CFIT typically lies farther upstream in the causal chain of events
among areas like violations of the rules, perceptual errors,
adverse mental states, and personal readiness failures.
An examination of the CFIT JSIT’s implementation
plan reveals that many of the recommendations map very
well onto these four human error causal categories. For
instance, it is quite likely that simply by increasing a pilot’s
awareness of the hazards of excessive risk-taking and other
causes of CFIT (numbers 2, 4, and 5 above) we can begin
to reduce the number of violations and personal readiness
failures committed by GA pilots. Perhaps this is where
the establishment of a General Aviation Safety Council
could help as well by organizing the distribution of training and informational materials directed at improving
pilot awareness of the issues surrounding CFIT. Indeed,
if we could somehow convince GA pilots that they are
four times more likely to die if they continue into IMC
when they are rated for VFR flight only, a significant
reduction in the number of fatal accidents might be realized (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2002). Perhaps then, they
might think twice before taking the chance of having an
accident. In much the same way, we can provide actual
data, rather than anecdotes and opinions, regarding the
hazards of flying without adequate rest or when tired
and fatigued. Indeed, while an individual GA pilots may
ignore anecdotes as rare events that only happen to the
other guy, the statistics may convince them otherwise.
Consistent with previous work in the area (Jensen &
Benel, 1977; Hunter, 2002; O’Hare, 1990), the data
presented here suggest that any training aimed at the
reduction of CFIT should also focus on adverse mental
states like overconfidence, self-induced pressure, and a
variety of other hazardous attitudes – particularly when
adverse mental states were nearly three times more likely
to be associated with CFIT than non-CFIT accidents.
Furthermore, because violations and personal readiness
failures are often associated with adverse mental states,
one would expect that many of the same interventions
would be effective in combating adverse mental states as
well. Consider, for example, the pilot who first learns to
fly. It’s very unlikely that a pilot with less that 100 hours
total flight time would press through the weather or try
flying through a mountain pass. But give that same pilot
three or four hundred hours in the aircraft and the confidence will build to a point where they might be more
likely to take risks not previously considered. The difficulty is teasing apart skill from overconfidence, because as
skill improves overconfidence will likely increase as well.
The unfortunate thing is that a pilot’s overconfidence
may lead them into a situation that their current skill
set cannot get them out of. Now, if we could somehow

Given the scope and detail of the analyses conducted
in this study using the HFACS framework with a considerably larger pool of accidents, it seemed reasonable
to examine which of the interventions identified by the
CFIT JSAT and JSIT would address the human error
associated with CFIT. Recall that, in the analysis of all
GA accidents occurring between 1990-98, skill-based
errors were associated with nearly 3/4 of all the accidents,
regardless of whether they were CFIT or not. Skill-based
errors were followed by decision errors (35.1%), physical/
mental limitations (18.3%), and violations of the rules
(14.3%). It should come as no surprise then, that skillbased errors (76.3%) and decision errors (33.5%) were
also the most frequently cited form of human errors associated with CFIT accidents as well. More interesting,
however, were those human errors that differentiated
CFIT from non-CFIT accidents. For instance, while
violations and perceptual errors contributed to only
12.4% and 7.2% of the non-CFIT accidents, respectively, they contributed to 31.6% (violations) and 12.5%
(perceptual errors) of CFIT accidents. Likewise, adverse
mental states and personal readiness failures were more
likely to occur during CFIT than non-CFIT accidents.
In fact, CFIT accidents were over four times more likely
to involve a personal readiness failure and three times
more likely to involve at least one violation of the rules.
So, how do these findings reconcile with the interventions and implementation plan proposed by the CFIT
JSAT and JSIT? First, it is hard to overlook the fact that
three out of four CFIT and non-CFIT accidents were
associated with skill-based errors, even though there
were no real differences between the two. Certainly
then, improving basic flight skills through improved
primary flight and recurrent training would likely have
an impact on all types of accidents, including CFIT.
But, in many instances, skill-based errors are that last
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control that pilot’s overconfidence either through enhanced training or increased awareness of the hazards
associated with excessive risk taking (see numbers 2, 4,
and 5 above) then maybe we can reduce the number of
violations and personal readiness failures committed by
GA pilots. Ultimately, this would have the effect of driving
down the number of CFIT accidents in general aviation.
So, how will the interventions developed by the CFIT
JSAT affect those CFIT accidents associated with perceptual errors and adverse mental states? Arguably, the small
percentage of CFIT accidents associated with these two
error forms was unexpected. After all, in many corners,
CFIT has often been attributed to spatial disorientation
and visual illusions that occur during visually impoverished
environments such as those experienced during IMC or at
night. Nevertheless, only 12.5% of the CFIT accidents examined occurred as the result of perceptual errors. In fact,
our analyses revealed that nearly as many CFIT accidents
occurred during daytime VMC as did those occurring in
visually impoverished conditions (i.e., during IMC or at
night). It is unclear then, to what extent using technology
such as a GPWS or other terrain avoidance technology
(number 1, above) would help. While it can be reasonably
argued that terrain displays and other warning systems
would address some of the problems associated with spatial disorientation at night or in the weather, there were
only 74 (10.6%) CFIT accidents in which a perceptual
error was committed in visually impoverished conditions.
Another 101 or 14.7% of the perceptual errors occurred
during broad daylight where presumably the errors were
simply misjudging airspeed and altitude or simply not
seeing obstacles due to inherent limitations in the visual
system. What may help in these instances would be the
use of high visibility paint and other enhancing features
on obstructions (number 6, above) combined with improved visual scan and safety awareness. Nevertheless,
the development of a low-cost terrain clearance or “look
ahead” device (number 1, above) may be worth examining.
It should also be noted that, although crew resource
management failures were infrequent, when they were
associated with CFIT accidents they were more than four
times more likely to occur during visually impoverished
conditions than during daytime VMC. Upon closer inspection, these failures were often the result of GA pilots
not taking advantage of all the resources at their disposal
prior to departing or while en route rather than the traditional crew resource management failures associated
with communication among multi-place crews. Indeed,
many of these failures were the result of not getting an
adequate weather update prior to departing or in the air.
While none of the CFIT JSIT’s eight areas specifically
deal with this particular issue (albeit, number 8 above,
does address the need to provide density altitude infor-

mation), it would not be difficult to emphasize the need
for frequent weather updates and encourage the use of
Flight Service Stations while en route within the training recommended to address CFIT. Indeed, the CFIT
JSAT did include improving the quality and substance
of weather briefs in their “top-10” list of interventions,
but it did not make the final list published by the CFIT
JSIT. Perhaps if they had the information presented
here, it might have been included in the final report.
Finally, the CFIT JSAT recommended the development of mountain flying advisory materials. While on
the surface this makes sense (i.e., the perception that
pilots are simply flying into mountains), not all CFIT
occur in mountainous terrain. For that matter, a number
of accidents are not even controlled flight into “terrain”
in the classical sense. That is, 581 (41%) were actually
controlled flight into “obstacles.” Arguably, there were very
few differences in the pattern of human error associated
with each, with the noted exception of skill-based errors
that were more likely during collision with terrain/water
and perceptual errors that were more likely during collision
with obstacles (presumably because the pilot could not
perceive them). In both cases, however, the odds ratios
were not large (i.e., they were less than 2). Perhaps the
plan to develop routes for GPS waypoints for mountain
passes (number 7, above) was driven more by the sample
of accidents the CFIT JSAT examined, since roughly
50% of those occurred in the mountains. Certainly, if
that were to be true for our larger sample of 1407 CFIT
accidents, it would warrant the emphasis the CFIT
JSAT and JSIT placed on it by including the development of routes for GPS waypoints in mountain passes.
Unfortunately, that data have yet to be examined fully.

CONCLUSIONS
Regardless of how one examines the data, using root
cause analysis or a human error framework like HFACS,
no single intervention will eliminate GA CFIT accidents.
What is needed is a strategy that combines several interventions into a concerted effort. More important, a means
to track intervention strategies is required to assess the
viability of each recommended intervention on specific
error forms – a proven quality of the HFACS framework.
It appears from our analysis that many, if not all, of the
interventions developed by the CFIT JSAT and the accompanying implementation plan proposed by the CFIT
JSIT will address many of the human error causal factors
associated with GA CFIT accidents. If nothing else, this
analysis provides further validation of the efforts of the
two teams. Beyond simple validation, however, HFACS
provides a means to track specific types of human error.
What the CFIT JSAT and JSIT were unable to provide
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is a listing of the specific types of human error committed by aircrew involved in CFIT. This analysis provides
a benchmark of sorts that will enable the FAA and other
safety organizations to track the effectiveness of these
interventions on very specific error forms. If for instance,
we do not see a significant trend downward in the number
and percentage of CFIT accidents attributable to violations
and personal readiness failures, we can re-evaluate the effectiveness of the targeted intervention and modify it as
needed. Better yet, rather than rely on an overall accident
rate that is affected by a variety of things other than the
specific interventions put in place to address CFIT, we can
now focus specifically on CFIT accidents and those human
errors most prevalent within the causal chain of events.
In summary, the analysis presented here represents
a first look at the human error associated with GA
CFIT accidents and is not the final word. While it does
validate the findings of the GA CFIT JSAT and JSIT,
it provides much more. In a sense, it puts a face on human error, particularly human error associated with
CFIT that we simply did not have prior to the HFACS
analysis. Now that we know what it looks like, we are
in a better position to find it and cut it off at its roots.
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